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Can educational institutions explain occupational choice between wage
employment and entrepreneurship? This paper follows Lazear￿ s (2005) Jack-
of-all-trades hypothesis according to which an individual with a more bal-
anced set of abilities is more likely to enter into entrepreneurship. In the
theoretical model proposed, abilities are an outcome of talent and educa-
tional institutions. Institutions, in turn, di⁄er with respect to mandatory
time in school and the scope of the curriculum. Implications of the theory
are tested using Swedish data for a school reform. Empirical results support
the main theoretical predictions.
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11 Introduction
Recent economic research has approached human capital as a multifaceted phe-
nomenon. The importance of non-cognitive abilities has been emphasized in works
by Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) and Borghans et al. (2008). Non-cognitive
dimensions such as motivation, socioemotional regulation, time preferences and
personality traits have a high predictive value for a range of labor market and be-
havioral outcomes. In view of these ￿ndings, Heckman (2008) makes a strong claim
that the traditional bias toward cognitive skills in research and policy should be
reduced. According to him, particular attention should be given to the multiplicity
of human abilities.
Lazear (2004; 2005) showed that the multiplicity of human capital is also rel-
evant for the study of self-employment and entrepreneurship.1 He proposed the
hypothesis that entrepreneurs are, in contrast to wage employees, generalists, or
jacks-of-all-trades (henceforth, JAT). For the small scale entrepreneur internal di-
vision of labor is not a feasible option, and hiring competent outside specialists
is often prohibitively costly. Hence, success depends on the entrepreneur￿ s ability
to undertake a wide range of di⁄erent tasks in addition to his or her core compe-
tency, e.g., marketing, accounting, customer relations, et cetera. For larger scale
entrepreneurs, both of these constraints are relaxed. However, Lazear still argues
that high competence in a broad set of skills is important: the entrepreneur should
be su¢ ciently "well-versed in a variety of ￿elds to judge the quality of applicants"
(Lazear 2005, p.650).2
In a formal analysis of the JAT theory, the entrepreneur is better able to
gain from complementarities between di⁄erent skills, but is also more vulnerable
to any weak link in the chain of abilities required. Moreover, if wage work is
1Following prior literature we will talk about entrepreneurs rather than self-employed, al-
though the latter are the ones we can identify in the data. The former is often taken to refer to
a particular kind of person whereas the later denotes occupational status (Iversen et al. 2008).
2One could add a third argument that builds on the role of the entrepreneur as an innovator.
Research on creativity and innovativeness has stressed the importance of combinations (e.g. Ward
2004). From this point of view, innovations are often a result of novel combinations of knowledge
pertaining to di⁄erent ￿elds of expertise. This implies that the entrepreneur as an innovator must
be highly skilled in a broad set of abilities. Whereas the discussion in Lazear (2005) pertains to
the entrepreneur as an organizer, this argument suggests that the JAT-hypothesis is also valid
when applied to the entrepreneur as an innovator.
2perfectly specialized, the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship is closely related to
the strongest ability. Taken together, these facts suggest that the probability of
becoming an entrepreneur decreases with the variation across di⁄erent skill levels
in the (multidimensional) set of human capital. The JAT theory has previously
been tested using generality of the entrepreneur￿ s ￿eld of education (Lazear 2005),
diversity in prior labor market experience (Wagner 2003; Astebro and Thompson
2007; Silva 2007) and variation in aptitude tests (Hartog, van der Sluis and van
Praag 2008).
This paper expands the JAT literature in two directions. First, we use a large
set of individual level data containing information about talents in early adoles-
cence to test the basic JAT hypothesis. The results are indicative of the expected
e⁄ect. More importantly, we proceed to test the interaction between educational
institutions, talents in adolescence and occupational choice.
Education is modeled as a one-period event that individuals enter with a vector
of talents and exit with a vector of abilities. Institutions that prescribe a longer
time in compulsory education are shown to reduce entry into entrepreneurship
for individuals who exhibit high variation in their set of talents. This is due to
e⁄ects of so-called dynamic complementarity ￿a skill begets skill e⁄ect ￿which
strengthens di⁄erences in skill levels and hence increases variation across skills.
We also show that probability of entry depends on the initial endowments of
skills that are una⁄ected by education. The likelihood of entering into entrepre-
neurship is more positively a⁄ected by a longer time in school for individuals with
a high talent for the relevant skills. These individuals gain the most from schooling
by developing abilities that are complementary to their initial skills.
This implies that changing the scope of the curriculum by either excluding or
including a particular skill will also a⁄ect entry decisions. In particular, if the
curriculum is expanded by integrating more skills, this has the strongest negative
e⁄ect on entry for individuals with high talents for abilities excluded in the old
regime. These individuals lose the complementary e⁄ect of education in the new
regime.
We test the propositions using a reform in compulsory education in Sweden
dating back to the 1960s. At the time of the reform, two random samples, each
consisting of about 10 percent of all individuals in a cohort, were surveyed, and
3data on their test results, interests and school performance together with back-
ground information were collected. Individuals from these two cohorts are matched
to recent labor market data. The data allow for a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach
similar to Meghir and Palme (2005). In accordance with the theoretical predic-
tions, the reform decreased entry into entrepreneurship for individuals with a high
variation across skills. Moreover, the change to a more comprehensive curriculum
reduced entry for those who scored high on an ability that was excluded in the old
system.
The result that the returns on education for entrepreneurs depend on abilities
una⁄ected by education (e.g., sociability, charisma) may be seen as a contribution
to the literature on entrepreneurship and human capital (Iyigun and Owen 1998).
It also relates to the issue of di⁄erential returns on education for entrepreneurs and
wage workers (Van der Sluis, van Praag and Vijverberg 2008; 2005; Van Praag and
van der Sluis 2007). This paper is also, to the best of our knowledge, the ￿rst to
put the production function approach to education (suggested by, e.g., Cunha and
Heckman 2007) into an occupational choice framework.
To put the issue discussed in this paper into a broader context, it is worth noting
the importance for economic growth that is often attached to the entrepreneur
(see, e.g., van Praag and Versloot 2007). A better understanding of the interaction
between education and occupational choice therefore implicitly relates to the e⁄ect
of education on growth.3 Moreover, the analysis in this paper can shed some light
on, and bind together, three trends that are pertinent in the twentieth century
economic history. During this time, the scope and extent of compulsory education
was heavily expanded in most developed countries. For instance, Boli, Ramirez
and Meyer (1985) discuss the rise of mass education and the striking similarities of
the newly built institutions. In tandem with this, the demise of entrepreneurship
was predicted in an in￿ uential work by Joseph Schumpeter (1942). It has since
been documented, notably by Loveman and Sengenberger (1991), that small scale
businesses ￿often assumed to be the natural habitat for entrepreneurs ￿in fact
3Research on the relation between education and growth has been dominated by two theoret-
ical approaches (see Krueger and Lindahl 2001). Following Nelson and Phelps (1966), research
has stressed the role of education and human capital in adopting new technologies. Second,
in endogenous growth theories accumulation of human capital sustains long run growth (Lucas
1988; Romer 1990).
4decreased in importance in the post-war development of major economies. Big
companies run on Fordist managerial principles with a high degree of specialization
were seen as the main drivers of economic growth (Galbraith 1967). A third trend,
which is consistent with the second, is the increased role of division of labor in
economic development (Smith 1965 [reprinted]; Becker and Murphy 1992).
If increased schooling makes individuals more apt for specialized tasks, the
three tendencies sketched above ￿t neatly together. One story that can be told is
that educational institutions evolved to better ￿t the needs of a specialized work-
force in big Fordist companies. The same institutions have endowed individuals
with human capital less conducive to JAT entrepreneurship.
2 Theory
2.1 Human capital formation
Assume that human capital can be described as a vector of ability levels for n
di⁄erent types of abilities (or synonymously, skills), denoted ￿. Each element
￿j 2 ￿ corresponds to a certain type of skill j.
Cunha and Heckman (2007) suggested that the skill level at time t + 1 can be
described in the following way:
￿t+1 = ft (h;￿t;It); (1)
where h is parental characteristics and It investments at time t. Including present
skill level ￿t allows for what they call self-productivity, i.e. a positive e⁄ect of past
skills on future skills. We simplify the recursive structure and consider only two
time periods. Let ￿ ￿ denote the vector of abilities before education and ￿ after. We
will refer to the former as talents and the latter as skills or abilities. The analysis
is further simpli￿ed by abstracting from parental characteristics.4
Investments in eq (1) correspond to characteristics of the educational system
in our setting. These are modeled using a vector S of length n where each element
sj ￿ 0 corresponds to one ability ￿j 2 ￿. The interpretation of sj = 0 is that the
4In the empirical part some controls for characteristics of the parents are included.
5curriculum pays no attention at all to ability j. The higher sj the more (quality
adjusted) time is spent on ability j. A larger S will be somewhat loosely called






Next, we impose some restrictions. A ￿rst assumption that is natural to make is






Although education has a positive e⁄ect on the transformation from talent to
(productive) abilities, it is plausible that some of the talent would be retained even
outside of school. The second assumption is similar to what Cunha and Heckman
(2007) call self-productivity. The higher the level of talent is for a speci￿c ability,






Now, we simplify the analysis considerably by assuming that education in a speci￿c
skill only a⁄ects this skill type. In other words, we preclude spillovers from edu-
cation in one ability to other abilities. Similarly, we assume that self-productivity






A ￿nal assumption is related to dynamic complementarity in Cunha and Heckman
(2007). Dynamic complementarity means that investments in abilities are more
productive when the prior talent is higher. This is captured by assuming that the
cross derivative of eq (2) with respect to its two arguments is positive. For our














In relation to compulsory education we also propose a slightly di⁄erent interpre-
tation. We will say that the system is more elitist the larger the value of (5). Such
a system is focused on strengthening those who have a high talent level. A more
egalitarian system would instead spend resources on supporting weak students.
2.2 Occupational choice
Lazear (2005) models a situation where an individual faces job market opportuni-
ties in the form of two di⁄erent kinds of wage employment and self-employment.
He considers a vector of abilities ￿ = f￿A;￿Bg. As an employee, the individual can
specialize in one of the two abilities. Hence, the two are perfect substitutes, and
the individual earns the higher of ￿A and ￿B. In entrepreneurship, the individual
must rely on both abilities, which are perfect complements, and the pro￿t is de-
termined by the lower of the two. In making the occupational choice, he or she
solves the problem:
maxfmax(￿A;￿B);￿min(￿A;￿B)g:
Abilities are expressed in terms of their market value and should be interpreted
as measures of productivity. For the setting to be interesting it must be assumed
that ￿ > 1. In e⁄ect, this parameter embodies relative compensation levels, where
wages have been normalized to 1. One intuition for ￿ > 1 is the possibility of
earning higher returns from using one￿ s abilities as complements in entrepreneur-
ship.5 For a distribution of ability vectors ￿, we can write a binary condition for
5Lazear (2005), and Astebro and Thompson (2007) show that the parameter can be derived
from a more fundamental production function where the entrepreneur employs the workers. ￿
will then summarize the relation between pro￿t and wages. They do so assuming an exogenously
given demand for entrepreneurs which is perfectly inelastic.
7entry into entrepreneurship as:
￿min(￿) ￿ max(￿); (6)
where the vector of abilities is given by eq (2).
The analysis here will be restricted to just one vector, ￿ (generated by a draw
of ￿ ￿ from some arbitrary distribution). Stochastics is introduced in the model by
letting ￿i be a draw from a probability distribution, ￿i ￿ G(￿). We have the
property of probability distribution functions that G0 > 0, and for simplicity we
will assume that G00(x) < 0 for x > 1.6 We can write the probability of becoming
an entrepreneur for a given ￿ as:






To facilitate the comparative statics exercise, it is assumed that elements in S
take either some speci￿c uniform value s or 0. In other words, all ability types
that are part of the curriculum are treated similarly (at a given talent level). This
assumption drastically simpli￿es the analysis by, among other things, implying that
the order between di⁄erent types of skills with sj = s is preserved. Comparative
statics are conducted either by increasing s or shifting sj for some ability type
from 0 to s.
2.3 Comparative statics
To simplify the analysis we let ￿ ￿
+ (￿
+) represent the most highly valued talent
(ability) in the vector of talents and ￿ ￿
￿ (￿
￿) the lowest. Moreover, assume that
all talents are parts of the curriculum, i.e. that sj = s for all j. We then have:















6A speci￿c case where this assumption holds is for G = N(￿;￿) with ￿ = 1.






































where the inequality follows from the assumption in (5) and the properties of a
probability distribution function. Although a more extensive system yields higher
abilities for both high and low talent, the high talent ability is furthered the most.
This is an e⁄ect of dynamic complementarity. Ability types that are already high
when entering schooling are the ones that gain the most. Education thus has the
e⁄ect of increasing the divergence among di⁄erent skills and hence the variance
in human capital. It is easily realized that this e⁄ect is stronger the larger the
distance is between ￿
￿ and ￿
+; for individuals with a perfectly balanced set of
talents, ￿
￿ = ￿
+, the e⁄ect on probability of entry is nil. Moreover, a more elitist
system, i.e., institutions with a larger inequality in (5), also yields a stronger
negative e⁄ect on entry.
Proposition 1 Longer education reduces the probability of entry due to the e⁄ect
of dynamic complementarity. The e⁄ect is increasing in the distance between
the highest and the lowest valued talents (and zero if these are equal).
Corollary 1 The cross e⁄ect of longer education and variance of talents is stronger
the more elitist the system is.
Next, consider the case when sj = 0 for one ability type (now letting ￿ ￿
+ and ￿ ￿
￿
denote the highest and lowest abilities for which sj = s). The level of talent for this
type of ability is denoted ￿ ￿
0, and the skill level is thus ￿
0 = ￿￿ ￿
0. What is the e⁄ect
of increasing s? The interesting cases are when ￿
0 < f(￿ ￿
￿;s) or ￿
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0 > f(￿ ￿
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0 < f(￿ ￿
￿;s)
if ￿
0 > f(￿ ￿
+;s)
: (9)
For the intermediate case where f(￿ ￿
+;s) > ￿
0 > f(￿ ￿
￿;s) the probability in eq
(8) is not a⁄ected by leaving one ability out of the curriculum. Also note that
the probability function has kinks where the level of the ability left out equals the
high or low ability. Figure 1 demonstrates the e⁄ect for a continuum of values of
s and ￿
0 > f(￿ ￿
+;0). For low s < s￿, return to employment and entrepreneurship
is determined by ￿
0 and ￿
￿, respectively. Return to employment is therefore
constant up to s￿, whereas return to entrepreneurship is increasing. In the region
s￿ < s < s￿￿, proposition 1 holds, and probability of entry decreases. For s > s￿￿,
the return to entrepreneurship is bounded by ￿
0, whereas return to employment
increases. The probability of becoming an entrepreneur consequently decreases.
The intuition for the result in (9) is that entrepreneurs gain from complemen-
tarity e⁄ects when the talent for the ability left out of the curriculum is high. For
instance, an individual with high sociability may use this skill as an entrepreneur
together with abilities acquired in school.
[Figure1: The e⁄ect of education when one ability is excluded from the
curriculum]
From (9) we know that the e⁄ect of education will be altered if ￿
0 either
substitutes the highest or the lowest of the abilities that are developed in school.
A high ￿
0 will tend to substitute the highest talent developed in school, which
implies that increasing s has a positive impact on entry into entrepreneurship. To
complete the analysis, we must evaluate the e⁄ect of a higher ￿
0 inside the regions
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0 < f(￿ ￿
￿;s)
if ￿




The positive signs follow from the assumption that G00(x) < 0 if the argument
x is larger than 1. Since the argument is the maximum over the minimum value,
this requirement holds. We summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Longer education (weakly) increases the probability of entry more
the higher the endowment value of an ability excluded from the curriculum.
Now consider what happens when the ability j for which sj = 0 is moved into
the curriculum by setting sj = s. An individual with a high value of ￿ ￿j = ￿ ￿
0
was, by proposition 2, the one for whom longer education increased probability of
entry the most. It is then intuitive that this individual will see the largest decline
in probability of entry following an expansion of the curriculum. An exception is
when ￿
0 is very low so that f(￿ ￿
0;s) < f(￿ ￿
￿;s). In this case, entry will increase
following a regime shift in which ￿ ￿
0 becomes part of the curriculum.
Proposition 3 A reform that incorporates a new skill type into the curriculum
has more negative e⁄ects on the probability of entry the higher the level of
the previously excluded ability (if the ability type excluded is not the lowest
valued talent).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Finally, we note that all e⁄ects discussed are cross-e⁄ects. We are not able to
say anything about the direct e⁄ect of a reform (longer education or greater scope
of curriculum) since these e⁄ects are in general dependent on the initial extent of
education (s).
We now turn to the empirical part of this study. A reform in the compulsory
schooling system is used to study the e⁄ects on entry into entrepreneurship later
in life. Using this reform we are able to get results related to proposition 1 and 3.
113 Empirical evidence
3.1 The reform
A reform in the Swedish compulsory education dating back to the 1950s/60s was
used to test the theoretical implications. Meghir and Palme (2005) study the
e⁄ects of the same reform on ￿nal educational attainment and earnings; a detailed
description of the reform can be found in Meghir and Palme (2003).
Before the reform, basic education in Sweden consisted of two parts: A basic
compulsory school (folkskola) and a junior secondary school (realskola). Junior
secondary school was a prerequisite for higher education, and selection into it was
based on performance after the sixth year in school. Those who were not selected
into junior secondary school continued for one or two more years (depending on
municipality) in the basic compulsory school. Those who quali￿ed for junior sec-
ondary school spent an additional three years in school before possibly moving on
to higher tiers of education. After the reform, all students were educated for nine
years in the same system.
The reform of compulsory education was the ￿rst step of a comprehensive
reform that merged what had previously been three types of secondary schools.
The political will was to break social injustices perceived to be created by early
selection into tracks with academic or vocational biases (Erikson and Johnsson
1993). The new system was intended to break labor market segregation between
academic and vocational occupations by raising the level of education in theoretical
subjects among blue-collar workers (Heidenheimer 1978; HusØn 1965).
Several changes were implemented in the curriculum concurrent with the re-
form. Embodied in the new curriculum was a new agenda with a broader and more
encompassing notion of education (Dahll￿f 1990; Richardson 2004). In particular,
the new curriculum gave more room to aesthetics and practical subjects such as
woodworking and home economics.
123.2 Presentation of the data
As part of a conscious strategy to calm political opposition, the reform was imple-
mented so as to facilitate evaluation (Heidenheimer 1974). The new comprehensive
system was introduced step-wise between 1949 and 1962, and two major evalua-
tions were conducted in 1961 and 1966. On these occasions, samples consisting of
about 10 percent of all students belonging to cohorts born in 1948 and 1953 were
surveyed (at age 13). The data from these surveys contain detailed information
on background variables, grades and test scores for about 20;000 individuals.
From this survey data, we have information on intelligence test scores, school
grades and questions related to the students￿spare time activities. The intelligence
test includes scores for three dimensions: ability to inductively continue numer-
ical series (inductive ability), to identify the opposite of a given word (linguistic
ability) and to recognize versions of ￿gures folded in di⁄erent ways (spatial abil-
ity). By using information about spare time activities, we can construct proxy
variables for interest in three dimensions. The ￿rst is interest for social activities
(sociability). The proxy used is the frequency of interaction with friends in spare
time. Based on measures of the frequency of reading books and newspapers, we
construct a variable for interest in general knowledge. The third proxy is interest
for technical and mechanical activities (mechanical). Finally, we construct a vari-
able for scholastic motivation that re￿ ects grades obtained when controlling away
the e⁄ect of intelligence.7
The available background data include information about the parents￿level of
educational attainment and their occupations. Using the latter, we constructed a
dummy variable indicating whether or not the father was an entrepreneur. Im-
portantly, we also have information about the municipality where an individual
attended compulsory schooling.
The theory gives us little guidance as how to de￿ne the ability set. To alleviate
some concerns about ad hoc de￿nitions of ability sets, we will use two di⁄erent
sets of abilities throughout. The narrow set of abilities consists of the three IQ
7The model we estimate is: Gradei = ￿+￿￿IQi+"i. Residuals " are obtained as proxies for
motivation. This is a stylized way of obtaining proxies for motivation where we abstract from the
e⁄ects from parental in￿ uence, school characteristics and other non-cognitive skills. Moreover,
the IQ measures are obtained as test scores which are also plausibly a⁄ected by motivation.
13measures. In addition to these, the broad set includes measures of sociability,
interest for general knowledge and scholastic motivation. The variables in each set
are ￿rst re-scaled from 0 to 100. For each individual, the variance is then obtained
as the variance across his values on the skills included in the set. The variable of
mechanical interest is used separately in an attempt to capture one skill that was
excluded from the curriculum prior to the reform but included in the post-reform
system.
The survey data is combined with more recent register data for the years 2001￿
06. From register data we have access to information on annual wage income
and income from self-employment and ￿nal educational attainment. Moreover,
an indicator allows us to distinguish between unincorporated and incorporated
self-employed individuals.8 An individual is coded as one of the two types of
entrepreneurs if she had this occupational status for at least three of the six years
covered.
Summary statistics for all variables involved are reported in the Appendix,
Table A1. In Table 1, we present some summary statistics divided into three
groups: employees and unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurs.
[Table 1. Summary statistics by occupational status]
Both types of entrepreneurs have lower ￿nal educational attainment levels than
employees. This is consistent with lower scholastic motivation at adolescence and
a lower interest in general knowledge. Those who became entrepreneurs, on the
other hand, scored higher on the intelligence test administered at adolescence.
Whereas having a father who is an entrepreneur increases the likelihood of
becoming an incorporated entrepreneur, it appears to have less e⁄ect on entry as
an unincorporated entrepreneur. Moreover, incorporated entrepreneurs tend to
have higher scores on the intelligence tests and score higher on sociability than
8The majority of unincorporated businesses are run as sole proprietorship. In contrast to an
incorporated business these are not juridical subjects. An individual is categorized as (unincor-
porated) self-employed if more than half of his income pertains to income from self-employment.
Income from self-employment is scaled by a factor 1.6 to allow for underreporting of earnings
from self-employment mainly due to tax-evasion motives. On average about 75 percent of total
income in the group of (unincorporated) self-employed is income from self-employment.
14unincorporated ones. Finally, we note that incorporated as well as unincorporated
entrepreneurs tend to have a lower variance than employees in both the narrow
and the broad sets of abilities.
Unincorporated self-employed individuals comprise 4:6 percent of the sample
and incorporated 4:1 percent.9 Unincorporated businesses are, from an occupa-
tional choice-theory point of view, more problematic than incorporated ￿rms. Most
importantly, the latter requires an equity stake, whereas all it takes to start an
unincorporated ￿rm is registration at the tax authority. Starting an incorporated
￿rm is therefore likely to be a more elaborate decision. Moreover, many ￿rms are
likely to change organizational form to becoming incorporated when they grow. To
some extent, this implies that incorporated ￿rms are more successful and therefore
arguably run by entrepreneurs who made ￿from a theory point of view ￿a correct
choice. These concerns, together with the di⁄erences shown in Table 1, suggest
that it is useful to separate the two types in the empirical analysis.
3.3 Methodology and predictions
The sequential implementation of the reform allows for an evaluation that controls
for cohort e⁄ects. The experiment was largely introduced on a municipality level
(at that time, Sweden consisted of about 2,500 municipalities). Some municipali-
ties were assigned to the experiment in 1966, when the second wave of the survey
was conducted, but not at the time of the ￿rst wave, 1961. This feature of the
reform allows for control of municipality-speci￿c e⁄ects. The e⁄ect of the reform
can be identi￿ed for individuals within a municipality where the reform status
changed from 1961 to 1966. The methodology applied here follows Meghir and
Palme (2005) closely: the basic regression model is:10
P(Entidm) = ￿0 + ￿1SchoolSystemidm + ￿1G(Abilityidm) +
￿2SchoolSystemidm ￿ G(Abilityidm) + ￿2mi + ￿3di + ￿Xidm + "idm:
9Individuals with no occupational status (i.e. neither self-employed nor wage employed) were
dropped from the sample, in order to match the binary occupational choice modelled.
10More generally it is in the tradition of Angrist and Kreuger (1991), Harmon and Walker
(1995), and Acemoglu and Angrist (2000).
15Sub indices i, d and m indicate individual, cohort and municipality, respectively.
Coe¢ cients ￿0 to ￿3 are scalars and ￿1, ￿2 and ￿ are vectors of coe¢ cients.
G(Ability) is a vector of functions that depend on di⁄erent abilities, SchoolSystem
is a dummy that indicates whether the individual was assigned to the new com-
prehensive system, and X is a vector of controls. The outcome variable Ent is a
dummy taking value 1 if the individual is an entrepreneur (of either type).
In this empirical design, the treatment group consists of individuals assigned
to the new compulsory school system. Who, then, are the a⁄ected individuals
within this group (Angrist 2004; Oreopoulos 2006)? As described, the new system
had two main e⁄ects: prescribing longer compulsory time in school and changing
the scope of the curriculum. Only individuals who would have quit after seven
years (i.e., the ones ending up in the folkskola) were impacted by the ￿rst e⁄ect.
The second e⁄ect impacted everyone assigned to the new system. Meghir and
Palme (2003) report that around 60 percent of a cohort quit after seven (or eight)
years before the reform (i.e., approximately 40 percent progressed to the realskola).
This indicates that it is important to identify the individuals actually a⁄ected by
spending a longer time in school.
We use two strategies to isolate the treatment e⁄ect. First, we note that the
educational attainment of the father is a good predictor of which school (folk-
skola or realskola) the individual went into prior to the reform (Meghir and Palme
2005; 2003). Second, we follow Oreopoulos (2006) and look at ￿nal educational
attainment. The argument is that individuals with higher attainment have higher
scholastic aptitude and are therefore the most likely to have been assigned to the
longer compulsory track (realskola) before the reform. To proxy the (counterfac-
tual) assignment, we divide the sample using an indicator for high (above compul-
sory level) paternal education and high (above upper secondary high school) ￿nal
educational attainment.11
We test propositions 1 and 3.12 The prediction from proposition 1 is that indi-
11Since the average education level has increased, it is reasonable that the educational level
that is required for an individual to count as highly educated is higher than for his father. Results
are robust to other divisions.
12Due to the nature of the reform Proposition 2 is hard to test. Arguably the broader and
more encompassing notion of education that was embodied in the new curriculum also had e⁄ects
on the development of for instance social skills.
16viduals with a high variation across talents decrease their probability of becoming
entrepreneurs if assigned to the new school system. Proposition 3 predicts that
individuals with a high talent for an ability excluded (here: interest for mechan-
ical activities) decrease their probability of being self-employed the most when
assigned to the new school system. We expect the ￿rst e⁄ect to pertain mainly to
individuals who either have a low ￿nal educational attainment themselves or who
have a father with low educational attainment.
3.4 Results
We ￿rst test the JAT proposition that low variance across abilities increases the
probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Table 2 shows the results for the variance
across the narrow and broad sets of abilities. The ￿rst column reports estimates
without any control for elements in the ability set. The e⁄ects are negative, and
estimates are statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels, although weakly for
the narrow set. An increase of one standard deviation in the variance in the broad
(narrow) set implies a decreased probability of entry of 1 (0:4) percentage points.
This corresponds to a 12 (5) percent decrease in entry probability.
To control for level e⁄ects, the second column for each set includes the sum of
the elements in the set. The estimate for the narrow set drops below conventional
signi￿cance levels, whereas the broad set remains highly signi￿cant. In the third
column, we include controls for each element of the ability set. The broad index is
still signi￿cant at the 10 percent level, and a one-unit change in standard deviation
changes the probability of entry about 0:6 percentage points.13
We also note from Table 2 that spatial intelligence is a good predictor of be-
coming an entrepreneur. The e⁄ect is strongly signi￿cant and a change of one
standard deviation implies a change in probability of entry of 1 percentage point.
[Table 2. Testing the JAT-hypothesis on talents in adolescence]
13Note that by including the elements of the sets we are including variables that are collinear
to the variance measures (which are by construction functions of the elements). This explains
some of the reduction in signi￿cance levels.
17Next, we add the new school system variable. We also include two interaction
variables re￿ ecting the interactions between the new school system and the vari-
ance across the set of skills and between the new school system and mechanical
ability. Table 3 reports results for the aggregate and for incorporated and unin-
corporated entrepreneurs separately. Estimates for the narrow and broad sets are
reported in separate columns. Note ￿rst that the variance measure is not signi￿-
cant in any of the speci￿cations, and neither is the main e⁄ect of the new school
system.
The ￿rst panel reports estimates for the probability of becoming either an un-
incorporated or an incorporated entrepreneur. The cross e⁄ect between the new
school system and the variance of the narrow set of abilities is negative and signi￿-
cant in all speci￿cations. The coe¢ cients for the cross e⁄ects between educational
system and the broad set of abilities are negative but below signi￿cance levels
when looking at the aggregate of the two types.
Turning to the second panel, we ￿nd negative and signi￿cant estimates for the
cross e⁄ect of school system and variance. These results are robust to inclusion of
the sum of components in the second column. For the narrow set, the estimates
drop below statistical signi￿cance levels when including controls for each ability
type separately in the third column.14 The size of the average e⁄ects is similar for
the narrow and broad sets. We can compare two individuals who only di⁄er in
their variance across abilities. One individual has a variance that is one standard
deviation higher than the other. If both attended the new school system instead of
the old, the one with the higher variation would experience a drop in probability
of becoming an entrepreneur of 0:75 percentage points (18 percent) relative to the
one with lower variation.
Finally, turning to the unincorporated entrepreneurs, we ￿nd little evidence
of a cross e⁄ect between school system and variation. The estimated coe¢ cients
are even positive (but insigni￿cant) for the broad set of abilities. However, the
interaction e⁄ect between mechanical skills and school system is now negative, and
14When controlling for the elements of the sets separately or as a sum, the speci￿cation also
includes an interaction term between these variables and the school system. This implies that
we allow education to have an independent e⁄ect on each element (or the sum of them). Again,
this means that we are including variables that are collinear to the ones of main interest, which
explains part of the reduced signi￿cance.
18the estimates are statistically signi￿cant. Again, compare two individuals with a
di⁄erence in mechanical skills of one standard deviation. Relative to the one with
lower ability, the other one experiences a reduction in probability of entry by 0:95
percentage points (21 percent) when the two attend the new school system instead
of the old.
[Table 3. Interaction e⁄ect between talents and the school system.]
Next, we split the sample depending on the individuals￿own and their fathers￿
￿nal educational attainment. Table 4 shows the results for the narrow and broad
sets of abilities and the two types of entrepreneurs reported in separate panels.
The two ￿rst columns report results for incorporated entrepreneurs. The cross
e⁄ects for variance and school system show the expected pattern both when the
sample is split according to the father￿ s education and the individual￿ s own edu-
cational attainment. Those who have a father with low educational attainment or
who themselves have themselves low educational attainment are the most likely
to experience a large treatment e⁄ect from the reform. These are also the indi-
viduals for whom the cross-e⁄ect between variation and school system is negative
and signi￿cant. The estimated e⁄ects are somewhat larger when the sample is
split according to own educational attainment. The largest estimated e⁄ect is for
the broad set of abilities and individuals with low educational attainment. Again,
performing the thought experiment with two individuals distanced one standard
deviation apart in variation across skills yields a reduction of 1:75 percentage points
(40 percent) in probability of entry.
Turning to the unincorporated entrepreneurs in the two lower panels, we obtain
a statistically signi￿cant negative cross e⁄ect between variation and school system
in only one case. This is for the narrow set of abilities when the sample is split
according to the father￿ s education. However, when split in the same way, the
estimated parameter is positive (but insigni￿cant) for the broad set of abilities.
With respect to the unincorporated entrepreneurs, we also see that the negative
cross e⁄ect between mechanical ability and school system pertains to those who
are most likely to be a⁄ected. We can also note that the same cross e⁄ect tends
to be positive for incorporated entrepreneurs in the two upper panels.
19[Table 4. Interaction e⁄ect between talents and the school system for di⁄erent
treatment groups.]
4 Discussion
This study has approached human capital as a multifaceted phenomenon. It has
been argued that not only the level of abilities but also the variance across abilities
matters. For an analysis of educational institutions this implies that it is not
su¢ cient to take duration, even if it is quality adjusted, into account. Features
such as the scope of curriculum and complementarities with non-cognitive skills
must be a part of the analysis.
As highlighted by recent research, the occupational choice between entrepre-
neurship and employment is one issue where multiplicity of abilities matter. Lazear
(2005) is the most recent proponent of the jack-of-all-trades approach to entrepre-
neurship. The entrepreneur is, in contrast to the employee, pictured as a general-
ist. As a generalist, the entrepreneur is able to draw on complementarities between
skills, but at the same time is vulnerable to weaknesses in his or her set of abilities.
Using a reform in the compulsory education system, we have investigated the
interaction between education and occupational choice. Variation across talents
was found to signi￿cantly a⁄ect the probability of entering entrepreneurship. This
is consistent with prior empirical work on the JAT hypothesis. When controlling
for di⁄erences in education, the e⁄ects of variation in talents disappear. In a
production function approach to human capital formation, this underscores the
importance of acknowledging features of educational institutions.
Individuals with a high degree of variation across abilities were found to be less
likely to enter (incorporated) entrepreneurship if they were assigned to the new
school system. An interpretation suggested by the theory developed here is that
the new, more extensive, school system was more e¢ cient in transforming talents
into abilities. Under the assumption of dynamic complementarities ￿i.e., that
skill begets skill ￿this implies a more divergent set of abilities for higher initial
variation across talents. This results in a lower probability of becoming a JAT
entrepreneur. Empirically, the e⁄ect is stronger for those who had a father with
20low educational attainment or who themselves had low educational attainment.
Individuals in this group had the highest probability of quitting school after seven
years and hence are most likely to be a⁄ected by longer (nine years) compulsory
education.
The empirical study also yielded results pertaining to interest in technical and
mechanical work. The probability of becoming an entrepreneur is lower for an
individual with a high score on interest for mechanical work if that individual
attended the new comprehensive school. The new school system was built on
a broader curriculum, where practical work (e.g., classes related to mechanical
and technical skills) was included. The theory predicts that such reform should
decrease entry the most for individuals who are highly talented in skills previously
excluded. The intuition is that, prior to the reform, these individuals had the most
to gain from complementarities between the skill excluded and the abilities learnt
in school. Hence, the theoretical proposition is supported empirically.
A human capital vector of multiple dimensions increases the complexity of the
analysis. A major concern is the overlap between di⁄erent skills, and connected to
this, the problem of de￿ning abilities at the same level of abstraction. Theoreti-
cally, we simpli￿ed the analysis by assuming non-overlapping skills and abstracting
from cross e⁄ects of developing one skill on other skills.
Empirically, we constructed two sets of talents, each of which arguably covers a
broad set of abilities. To some extent this mitigates concerns that the JAT theory
rests on the assumption that the same type of abilities is used in employment
and entrepreneurship. Since technological as well as organizational constraints are
likely to segment the labor market, this is arguably problematic. For instance,
services that require practical skills may be more e¢ ciently organized as small-
scale businesses, whereas more analytical skills are better coordinated in large
organizations.
The broad conclusion that emerges from this study is that educational institu-
tions matter for occupational choice into wage employment or entrepreneurship.
Moreover, the result strengthens the case for analyzing the occupational choice
decision in a setting where human capital is formed by multiple abilities. In the
context of entrepreneurship, this has some policy implications. By acknowledging
the multiplicity of human capital, a narrow-minded educational policy could be a
21system in which attention is paid to each individual￿ s most promising talents. One
reason for such a recommendation is that in specialized employment, investment
in a broad set of abilities implies a waste of resources. However, if entrepreneurs
are jacks-of-all-trades, and if we believe that entrepreneurship (which one could
de￿ne broadly as creative and innovative economic activities) is important, the
policy prescriptions are di⁄erent. An educational policy with the goal of promot-
ing entrepreneurship would focus on developing skills which are complementary to
the ability in which an individual is endowed with the highest talents.
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Figure 1. Effects increasing extent of school when one ability is excluded from 
curriculum. 
 Table 1 
Summary statistics by occupational status 
   Employees    Incorporated 
Entrepreneurs    Unincorporated 
Entrepreneurs 
Final educational attainment   2.81  1.55   2.53  1.51   2.37  1.50 
High father education   0.17     0.19  -   0.17  - 
Father entrepreneur   0.06     0.13  -   0.08  - 
                
IQ inductive   49.80  20.09   52.23  18.81   50.43  19.36 
IQ spatial   53.58  18.24   57.08  18.31   55.62  17.86 
IQ linguistic   57.16  17.44   58.10  15.62   56.44  16.97 
                
Scholastic motivation   46.26  10.68   44.66  10.59   44.94  10.92 
Sociability   76.02  27.12   78.66  25.87   73.82  27.62 
General knowledge   70.86  25.91   66.50  26.41   67.32  26.88 
Mechanical skill   51.06  24.00   61.35  22.26   59.86  24.47 
                
Variance (narrow ability set)   12.44  6.48   12.37  6.42   11.96  6.30 
Variance (broad ability set)   22.33  6.14   21.67  5.80   21.63  6.12 
                
Observations   18128    818     912   
Note: Final educational attainment takes values 1–6, where 1 is the lowest attainment (corresponding to the old 
folkskola) and 6 is the highest (PhD degree). Father’s education is a dummy taking value 1 if the educational 
attainment of the father has education above compulsory schooling. Father entrepreneur is a dummy variable 
taking value 1 if the occupational status of the father (codes 14, 52 and 62–64). The narrow index consists of 
three IQ measures, and the broad index of the same three IQ measures, a measure of scholastic motivation, 
general knowledge and sociability. Table 2 
Testing the JAT-hypothesis on talents in adolescence 
 Narrow  ability  set    Broad ability set 
Dependent variable: Entry 
into self-employment            
Variance  -0.064  -0.059  -0.037   -0.170 -0.174 -0.094 
 (0.037)*  (0.037)  (0.041)    (0.044)*** (0.044)*** (0.052)* 
IQ inductive     0.012        0.028 
     (0.019)        (0.017) 
IQ spatial     0.057        0.053 
     (0.020)***        (0.020)*** 
IQ linguistic     -0.031        -0.029 
     (0.020)        (0.021) 
Scholastic motivation             0.003 
           (0.026) 
Sociability             -0.013 
           (0.011) 
General knowledge             -0.027 
           (0.011)** 
Sum of components   0.013        -0.004   
    (0.006)**      (0.004)   
             
Observations  14610  14610  14610   13590 13590 13590 
Note: Standard errors clustered on home municipality reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses – *** 
indicates p-value <0.01, ** p-value<0.05, and * p-value<0.1. Coefficients and standard errors have been scaled by 
a factor 10
2. 
    All regressions include a constant term and controls for sex, cohort, mother’s and father’s education and a 
dummy taking value 1 if the father was an entrepreneur. The narrow index consists of three IQ measures, and the 




Interaction effect between talents and the school system 
  Narrow ability set    Broad ability set 
Dependent variable: Self-employment  
in incorporated and unincorporated firm 
       
School system   0.119 -2.236  -2.086    0.138  -4.223  -0.204 
 (0.614)  (1.746)  (1.942)    (0.589) (3.203) (3.978) 
Variance  0.044  0.044 0.084   -0.107 -0.121 0.007 
 (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.065)    (0.073) (0.074) (0.090) 
Mechanical skills  0.050  0.049  0.041    0.055 0.058 0.059 
 (0.022)**  (0.022)**  (0.022)*    (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.024)** 
Variance x School system  -0.170  -0.159  -0.175    -0.065 -0.053 -0.135 
 (0.079)**  (0.079)**  (0.085)**    (0.085) (0.086) (0.103) 
Mechanical skills x School system  -0.010  -0.012  -0.007    -0.013 -0.016 -0.025 
 (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)    (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
             
Observations  14262  14262  14262    13274 13274 13274 
Dependent variable: Self-employment  
in incorporated firm 
           
School system   0.744 -0.927  -0.255    0.541  -1.258  -0.805 
 (0.475)  (1.300)  (1.321)    (0.471) (2.324) (2.949) 
Variance  0.065  0.066 0.076   -0.002 -0.003 0.033 
 (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.048)    (0.045) (0.046) (0.058) 
Mechanical skills  0.006  0.004  0.001    0.015 0.013 0.011 
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)    (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Variance x School system  -0.128  -0.119  -0.104    -0.127 -0.120 -0.139 
 (0.059)**  (0.060)**  (0.066)    (0.059)** (0.060)** (0.076)* 
Mechanical skills x School system  0.024  0.022  0.025    0.018 0.018 0.020 
 (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)    (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
             
Observations  13481  13481  13481    12549 12549 12549 
Dependent variable: Self-employment  
in un incorporated firm 
           
School system   -0.508  -1.716  -1.993    -0.541 -3.350 -0.360 
 (0.450)  (1.570)  (1.717)    (0.451) (2.677) (3.054) 
Variance  -0.010  -0.012  0.022   -0.100 -0.117 -0.012 
 (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.055)    (0.059) (0.060) (0.074) 
Mechanical skills  0.054  0.056  0.051    0.053 0.058 0.062 
 (0.018)***  (0.019)***  (0.019)***  (0.019)***  (0.020)*** (0.021)*** 
Variance x School system  -0.052 -0.049  -0.078    0.058 0.065 0.004 
 (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.064)    (0.068) (0.069) (0.084) 
Mechanical skills x School system  -0.038  -0.039  -0.037    -0.037 -0.040 -0.051 
 (0.017)**  (0.017)**  (0.017)**   (0.018)**  (0.018)** (0.019)*** 
             
Observations  13539  13539  13539    12593 12593 12593 
Control for sum of component  No Yes  No    No  Yes  No 
Controls for components  No  No  Yes    No No Yes 
Note: Regressions include controls for home municipality and the standard errors clustered on home municipality 
reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses – *** indicates p-value <0.01, ** p-value<0.05, and * p-
value<0.1. Coefficients and standard errors have been scaled by a factor 10
3. 
     All regressions include a constant term and controls for sex, cohort, mother’s and father’s education and a 
dummy taking value 1 if the father was an entrepreneur. The narrow index consists of three IQ measures, and the 
broad index of the same three IQ measures, a measure of scholastic motivation, general knowledge and 
sociability. When controlling for the sum of the index components or the individual components separately, an 
interaction term with the new school system is also included.  
Table 4 


















Dependent variable: Self-employment  
in incorporated firm.             
Variance in narrow index             
             
School system  -0.273  -0.475 -0.391   -0.273  -0.714  -0.128 
 (1.290)  (1.453)  (4.456)   (1.290)  (1.762)  (2.836) 
Variance x school system  -0.105  -0.139 -0.043   -0.105  -0.154  -0.050 
 (0.066)  (0.071)**  (0.153)   (0.066)  (0.085)*  (0.096) 
Mechanical skills x school system  0.025 0.037  -0.040    0.025 0.036  -0.007 
 (0.019)  (0.019)**  (0.045)   (0.019)  (0.021)*  (0.033) 
Observations  13483 11037  2446    13483 8591  4892 
             
Dependent variable: Self-employment  
in incorporated firm 
           
Variance in broad Index             
             
School system  -1.002 -1.010  -11.630   -1.002 -0.964  -6.843 
 (2.915)  (3.315)  (8.415)   (2.916)  (3.983)  (5.663) 
Variance x school system  -0.140  -0.176 -0.017   -0.140  -0.285  0.070 
 (0.076)*  (0.088)**  (0.145)   (0.091)  (0.108)***  (0.091) 
Mechanical skills x school system  0.020 0.025  -0.019    0.020 0.031  -0.006 
 (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.050)   (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.031) 
Observations  12551 10277  2274    12551 7989  4562 
             
Dependent variable: Self-employment  
in unincorporated firm 
           
Variance in narrow index             
             
School system  -1.855  -1.515 -3.075   -1.855  -1.739  -2.354 
 (1.651)  (1.623)  (5.940)   (1.651)  (2.159)  (2.573) 
Variance x school system  -0.077 -0.132  0.119    -0.077 -0.102  0.081 
 (0.064)  (0.071)*  (0.156)   (0.064)  (0.086)  (0.094) 
Mechanical skills x school system  -0.036 -0.039  0.004    -0.037 -0.064  0.008 
 (0.017)**  (0.019)**  (0.039)   (0.017)**  (0.023)***  (0.024) 
Observations  13541 11100  2441    13541 8642  4899 
             
Dependent variable: Self-employment  
in unincorporated firm 
           
Variance in broad Index             
             
School system  0.227 2.246  -9.568    0.237 1.551  -3.270 
 (3.055)  (3.366)  (9.555)   (3.055)  (4.239)  (4.718) 
Variance x school system  0.003 0.014  -0.055    0.003 -0.029  0.054 
 (0.084)  (0.091)  (0.183)   (0.084)  (0.121)  (0.126) 
Mechanical skills x school system  -0.050  -0.057 -0.010   -0.050  -0.086  0.020 
 (0.019)***  (0.021)***  (0.045)   (0.019)*** (0.025)***  (0.027) 
Observations  12595 10327  2268    12595 8029  4566 
Note: Regressions include controls for home municipality and the standard errors clustered on home municipality 
reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses – *** indicates p-value <0.01, ** p-value<0.05, and * p-
value<0.1. Coefficients and standard errors have been scaled by a factor 10
3. 
    All regressions include a constant term and controls for sex, cohort, mother’s and father’s education and a 
dummy taking value 1 if the father was an entrepreneur. In addition to this, the regressions contain controls for the 
individual parts of the indices and interaction terms between these and the school system. The narrow index 
consists of three IQ measures, and the broad index of the same three IQ measures, a measure of scholastic 
motivation, general knowledge and sociability. APPENDIX
Proof of proposition 3
We have six di⁄erent cases for a given length of education s. We evalute
the change in probability of entry ￿P (di⁄erence between after and before ￿
0
is included in curriculum) due to the regime shift and the cross-e⁄ect with the
value of ￿
0 inside each region. The following properties and assumptions are
used in each case
G(x1) > G(x2) if x1 > x2
G0(x1) > G0(x2) if 1 < x1 < x2
￿ Case 1: f(￿ ￿
0;0) > f(￿ ￿
+;s) (> f(￿ ￿
+;0)) and f(￿ ￿
0;s) > f(￿ ￿
+;s)


































￿ Case 2: f(￿ ￿
0;0) ￿ f(￿ ￿
+;s) and f(￿ ￿
0;s) > f(￿ ￿
+;s)



























￿ Case 3: f(￿ ￿
0;0) > f(￿ ￿
￿;s) and f(￿ ￿
0;s) < f(￿ ￿
+;s)




















￿ Case 4: f(￿ ￿
0;0) ￿ f(￿ ￿
￿;s) and f(￿ ￿
0;s) > f(￿ ￿
￿;s)
































5 < 0￿ Case 5: f(￿ ￿
0;0) < f(￿ ￿
￿;s) and f(￿ ￿
0;s) < f(￿ ￿
￿;s)
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Table A1 
Descriptive statistics 
 Observations  Mean  Standard  deviation 
Entrepreneur  19858 0.087  - 
Incorporated entrepreneur  19858 0.041  - 
Unincorporated entrepreneur  19858 0.046  - 
      
School system  21127 0.572  - 
      
Sex  21127 0.491  - 
Father high education  21127 0.174  - 
Father entrepreneur  20139 0.072  - 
High educational attainment  21127 0.353  - 
      
IQ inductive  19306 56.37   
IQ spatial  19306 53.12  18.47 
IQ linguistic  19285 48.73  20.23 
Scholastic motivation  18061 45.70  10.74 
Sociability  19143 76.01  27.35 
General knowledge  19178 70.63  25.97 
Mechanical skill  18773 0  23.97 
      
Narrow index  19285 0  6.47 
Broad index  17872 0  6.13 
Note: Incorporated entrepreneurs are owners of an incorporated firm from which they earn wage income. 
Unincorporated entrepreneurs is sole proprietorship. An individual is coded as an unincorporated entrepreneur if 
1.6 times income from self-employment is the largest source of income.  
    Father’s education is a dummy taking value 1 if the educational attainment of the father has education above 
compulsory schooling. Father entrepreneur is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the occupational status of the 
father (codes 14, 52 and 62–64). Final educational attainment takes values 1–6, where 1 is the lowest attainment 
(corresponding to the old folkskola) and 6 is the highest (PhD degree). High educational attainment is a dummy 
taking value 1 if educational attainment is 4 or above corresponding to education above upper secondary high 
school). 
     The narrow index consists of three IQ measures, and the broad index of the same three IQ measures, a 
measure of scholastic motivation, general knowledge and sociability. 
     Data for income, occupational status and final educational attainment are register data from the so called 
LOUISE database. Data on school system, test scores and parental background are from the UGU dataset. 
 